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Abstract: 
 
PƌofouŶd aŶd ŵultiple leaƌŶiŶg diffiĐulties, oƌ ͞PMLD͟, is a label given to children in the United 
Kingdom who are said to be affected by the severest of impairments to consciousness and cognition 
stemming from neuro-developmental disorders. These impairments are deemed to be so extensive 
that children with PMLD are described as lacking in explicit awareness of themselves, others, and the 
surrounding world. The severity of such impairments typically precludes children with PMLD from 
participating in mainstream education. Instead, best educational practice is said to consist of 
segregated and controlled environments with intense, one-to-one input from members of staff 
trained in specialist intervention methodologies. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present a project that broke away from conventional (psychological) 
theory, (positivist) research methodologies, and (special) educational practices found in the PMLD 
field in order to develop new understandings and experiences of children with PMLD. The project 
explored the opportunities for engagement that non-tƌaditioŶal ;i.e. ͞iŶĐlusiǀe͟Ϳ leaƌŶiŶg 
environments present for children with PMLD, and the kind of growth and learning that can emerge 
in relation to such environments. Exploration of such engagement was conducted through the 
application of an interpretivist-participatory methodology that was sensitive to idiosyncratic forms 
of experience and comportment. A critical phenomenological approach (Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
1908-1961) was utilized to analyze differences in experiences and comportment in relation to 
different learning environments. What becomes apparent through the juxtaposition of alternative 
theoretical, methodological and contextual approaches is that children with PMLD engage with and 
experience their environments in ways more complex than existing conceptual frameworks capture. 
Implications of this complexity for theory, research and practice are discussed. 
 
 
 
The ǁoƌk pƌeseŶted iŶ this papeƌ is ďased oŶ BeŶ͛s doĐtoƌal thesis of the saŵe title ;UŶiǀeƌsitǇ of 
Exeter 2010: supervised by Dr. Phil Bayliss (Exeter), Dr. Debbie Watson (Bristol), and examined by 
Prof. Dan Goodley (MMU) and Dr. Deborah Osberg (Exeter)). 
 
The paper includes draft material written for the forthcoming book: 
 
Simmons, B.R. and Watson, D. L. (in preparation – 2013) {working title} The "PMLD ambiguity": 
Resisting objectification and articulating the life-worlds of children with profound and multiple 
learning difficulties, London: Karnac Books  
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Introduction 
 
PƌofouŶd aŶd ŵultiple leaƌŶiŶg diffiĐulties, oƌ ͞PMLD͟, is a laďel giǀeŶ to ĐhildƌeŶ ǁho are said to 
experience the severest of cognitive impairments which stem from neurodevelopmental disorders 
(MDRT Oxfordshire 2001).  The abilities of such children are often compared to those of the neonate 
or infant insofar as children with PMLD are described as operating at the pre-verbal stages of 
development (i.e. the earliest stages of development which infants are said to pass through during 
theiƌ fiƌst Ǉeaƌ of lifeͿ ;Buƌfoƌd ϭϵϴϴ; CaƌŶaďǇ ϮϬϬϰ, Coupe O͛KaŶe aŶd Goldďaƌt ϭϵϵϴ, NiŶd & 
Hewett 1994; 2001, PMLD Netǁoƌk ϮϬϬϭ, Waƌe ϭϵϵϰ; ϮϬϬϯͿ.  CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, a ƌaŶge of ͞pƌe-͟ 
descriptors are used in the PMLD literature to indicate that such children typically fail to reach 
particular developmental milestones associated with later infancy.  For example, children with PMLD 
are understood as being pre-volitional (they lack agency and cannot move with intent) (Logan et al. 
2001); pre-contingency aware (they do not show awareness of cause-effect relationships) (Ware 
1994; 2003); pre-intersubjective (they do not repƌeseŶt otheƌ people as suďjeĐts ͞like ŵe͟, aŶd 
cannot differentiate between subject and object); pre-communicative (they are pre-symbolic and 
ĐaŶŶot iŶteŶtioŶallǇ ĐoŶǀeǇ ŵeaŶiŶg to otheƌsͿ ;Goldďaƌt ϭϵϵϰ, Coupe O͛KaŶe aŶd Goldďaƌt ϭϵϵϴͿ; 
stereotypic in behaviour (they display reflexive, non-volitional behaviour) (Tang et al. 2003); and 
who are at high risk of living in a world of confusion (Cartwright and Wind-Cowie 2005, Ouvry 1987).  
In addition to profoundly delayed cognitive development, children with PMLD are also said to be 
prone to a range of other difficulties including physical impairments, sensory impairments, mental 
illness, complex medical conditions, and limited life expectancies (Lacey 1998, MDRT Oxfordshire 
2001, PMLD Network 2001, WHO 1992).  Against this backdrop, children with PMLD are described as 
being highly dependent on others for the most rudimentary care needs and are deemed to require a 
lifetime of support (Carnaby & Cambridge 2002, Logan et al. 2005). 
 
In recent years the United Kingdom has witnessed a rise in children with special educational needs 
and disabilities attending mainstream schools – learners who have traditionally been educated in 
segregated, specialist schools and units.  The impetus for such change has largely come from 
legislation in the form of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Act (SENDA) (OPSI 2001).  
“ENDA has eŶshƌiŶed ĐhildƌeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ pƌoǀisioŶ aŶd ŵade the ƌefusal of aĐĐess oŶ 
the gƌouŶds of a Đhild͛s iŵpaiƌŵeŶts diffiĐult.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, the recent House of Commons Select 
Committee on Education and Skills report (2006) on special educational needs has supported the 
general view that inclusive education may only go so far and that full-time mainstream placements 
for some children are unrealistic.  Similarly, Baroness Warnock (2005) has recently challenged the 
extent to which inclusion can be achieved for all and has championed a future and ongoing role for 
special schools.  The views of the House of Commons Select Committee (2006) and of Baroness 
Warnock (2005) are continuous with the Special Educational Needs Code of Practice (SENCOP) (DfES 
2001).  SENCOP (DfES 2001) falls into a familiar governmental policy pattern of emphasising the 
need for inclusive education for most children whilst reinforcing the segregation of a selected few 
(Croll and Moses 2000).  Specifically, SENCOP (2001) describes how local education authorities must 
ĐoŵplǇ ǁith paƌeŶts͛ pƌefeƌeŶĐe of sĐhool uŶless: 
 
͞΀...΁ the sĐhool is uŶsuitaďle to the Đhild͛s age, aďilitǇ, aptitude or special educational 
needs, or the placement would be incompatible with the efficient education of the 
other children with whom the child would be educated, or with the efficient use of 
ƌesouƌĐes͟ ;DfE“ ϮϬϬϭ, p.ϭϬϳͿ. 
 
Children with PMLD make up part of the group for which inclusive education is deemed unsuitable 
and unrealistic.  It is argued that such children do not have the cognitive capacity to meaningfully 
engage with standard learning environments; that mainstream teachers lack the knowledge and 
skills required to support the development of children with PMLD; and that only special schools 
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house the appropriate infrastructure and resources that children with PMLD require (Ainscow and 
Haile-Giorgis 1998, Chesley and Calaluce 1997, Foreman et al. 2004, Ouvry 1987).  Instead of being 
included within mainstream schools, a commonly proposed model for children with PMLD is one of 
͞iŶĐlusioŶ͟ iŶ a ŵiǆed-ability class within existing special school provision (as opposed to being 
placed in a separate special care unit attached to a special school) (Bayliss & Pratchett 2004, 
Pratchett 2005, Simmons and Bayliss 2007). 
 
 
The Study
1
 
 
The context for the discussion in this paper revolves around an inclusive education research project 
iŶǀolǀiŶg a ǇouŶg ďoǇ ǁith PMLD Đalled ͞“aŵ͟.  The pƌojeĐt aimed to illuminate the ways in which 
mainstream education can benefit children who are traditionally educated in special schools.  
Specifically, the aim of the project was to further our understanding of peer engagement for Sam. 
For example, we explored whether alternative educational contexts offered qualitatively different 
opportunities for peer engagement and how these differences could lead to new learning 
opportunities.  For over three years Sam spent one day a week at his local mainstream primary 
sĐhool, aŶd foƌ the ƌest of the ǁeek atteŶded a speĐial Đaƌe Đlass iŶ a ŶeighďouƌiŶg ĐitǇ͛s speĐial 
school.  
 
The research methodology was interpretivist and consisted of three inter-linked elements.  This is 
not the place to go into great detail, but further information related to the methodology can be 
found elsewhere (see Bayliss, 2004; Bayliss and Simmons, 2005; Simmons and Bayliss, 2005).  To 
summarise, firstly a series of semi-structured interviews took place in order to gather the views of 
significant others (parents, teachers, teaching assistants etc) who knew Sam well in order to grasp 
interpretations of others and direct initial observations.  Second, extended periods of participatory 
observations were undertaken where a researcher effectively acted as a teaching assistant for Sam 
once a week in his special school and once a week in his mainstream school.   Finally, periods of non-
participatory observation were undertaken.  It was during these moments that most data was 
accrued through vignette writing and it is this data which will be discussed shortly.  The production 
of ǀigŶettes esseŶtiallǇ iŶǀolǀed ǁƌitiŶg iŶ gƌeat depth aďout sŵall eǀeŶts iŶ “aŵ͛s sĐhool life, 
particularly where opportunities for social interaction emerged.   Dozens of vignettes were recorded 
eaĐh daǇ ďoth iŶ “aŵ͛s ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ aŶd speĐial sĐhool settiŶgs oǀeƌ the spaĐe of a Ǉeaƌ.  The 
quantity and richness of the vignettes allowed the researchers to submerge themselves in the data 
in order to look for common themes.   
 
“aŵ͛s leǀel of soĐial eŶgageŵeŶt ǀaƌied sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ depeŶdiŶg oŶ ǁhiĐh sĐhool he atteŶded aŶd 
which type of communication partner was accessible to him.  In his special sĐhool, “aŵ͛s ŵaiŶ 
communication partners were classroom staff and school therapists who supported Sam during 
lessons and therapy-based sessions.  Sam was happy with the adults in his special school, although 
things were done to Sam by adults (e.g. personal care, therapy-based sessions, sensory stimulation 
etc) which he clearly enjoyed. 
 
It was extremely rare to see Sam interacting with his special school peers.  When opportunities did 
arise (i.e. when the children were located close to Sam), Sam did not attempt to initiate interaction 
or respond to potential initiations from other peers.  The general opinion of the classroom staff was 
that Sam was unable to recognise the subtle communicative abilities of his peers and as such he was 
largely passive and distaŶt aƌouŶd theŵ.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶ his ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ sĐhool, “aŵ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
                                                             
1
 The outline of this study is taken from: Simmons, B.R., Blackmore, T.D., and Bayliss, P.D. (2008) Postmodern 
synergistic knowledge creation: extending the boundaries of disability studies, in Disability and Society 23 (7), 
pp. 733-745 
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partners consisted of classroom assistants and peers, and he was incredibly socially active.  Sam 
reached out to other children very regularly and engaged with others.  Instances of Sam interacting 
with adults were recorded.  However, Sam reached out to and engaged with his mainstream peers 
much more than he did with the adults from either schools.  During the first two terms Sam often 
attempted to initiate interaction by making eye contact, grabbing other children (their arms, legs, 
hair etc), leaning on them (especially during carpet time) or by simply holding on to them.  
Reciprocal peer-engagement was often observed, with Sam and his peers mimicking one another 
and waiting in anticipatioŶ foƌ eaĐh otheƌ͛s ƌespoŶse aŶd ofteŶ giggliŶg togetheƌ.  Peeƌs ofteŶ 
attempted to initiate interaction with Sam by talking to him, holding his hand and sharing items with 
him (i.e. their toys).  Sam responded back enthusiastically.   
 
In the third teƌŵ, “aŵ͛s atteŵpts to iŶteƌaĐt ǁith his ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ peeƌs ďeĐaŵe ŵoƌe ͚soĐiallǇ 
aĐĐeptaďle͛.  He ǁas ŵuĐh ŵoƌe geŶtle ;e.g. he pulled the otheƌ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s haiƌ ŵuĐh lessͿ, gaǀe 
children hugs (rather than grabbing and firmly holding onto them), made more eye contact and for 
longer periods of time, and stroked or placed his hands on others if he wanted attention.  Sam began 
behaving in the way that other children were encouraged to behave towards him, showing an 
increased awareness of socially desirable communication skills.  By the end of the term more 
children were approaching Sam and those that were shy of him in the first term became increasingly 
confident and engaged with him.  The children provided a wealth of opportunities for Sam to 
communicate with others and practice his communication skills – a task he embarked on 
enthusiastically.  
 
Theƌe ǁas also a ŵaƌked iŶĐƌease iŶ the fƌeƋueŶĐǇ aŶd ƋualitǇ of “aŵ͛s eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith his speĐial 
school peers in the third term indicating a transference of communication skills.  Sam exhibited 
some of his mainstream communicative behaviours in his special school, i.e. he started to crawl over 
to his peers, hug and gently stroke them.  On several occasions his peers indicated their pleasure in 
“aŵ͛s affeĐtioŶ ďǇ giggliŶg, hugging him back or indicating that they wanted more in their own 
idiosyncratic ways. 
 
Despite “aŵ͛s iŶĐƌeased soĐial eŶgageŵeŶt iŶ his speĐial sĐhool, the aŵouŶt aŶd duƌatioŶ of 
mainstream interactions was much greater.  Further, the quality of these mainstream interactions 
was markedly different with many examples of emerging behaviour involving interactions with 
people ǁith oďjeĐts.  “aŵ shoǁed aŶ iŶĐƌeased iŶteƌest iŶ his peeƌs͛ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt ǁith oďjeĐts.  
When a peer ceased using an object, Sam would often pick up the item and explore it himself 
(visually, orally and/or kinaesthetically with his hands) and sometimes attempted to interact with 
the peer after his exploration of the object. 
 
 
Extended Discussion  
 
This research project (above) has been reported in order to provide a site for assessing the extent to 
which the different theoretical perspectives (behaviourist psychology, cognitive psychology, and 
pheŶoŵeŶologǇͿ ŵake iŶtelligiďle “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ.  “uĐh aŶalǇsis tests the usefulŶess of existing 
and alternative perspectives, which in turn provides material for discussion in the concluding 
chapter regarding the efficacy of dominant (behaviourist/cognitive) and alternative 
(phenomenological) approaches to thinking about PMLD.  With this in mind, I now present the 
findings of the research and discuss the findings in relation to the different perspectives. 
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Switch-based activities 
 
MaŶǇ of “aŵ͛s plaŶŶed leaƌŶiŶg oppoƌtuŶities iŶ his speĐial sĐhool ƌeǀolǀed aƌouŶd the use of 
micro-switches.  These switch-based activities resembled those described in the behaviourist-
oriented PMLD literature as described in Chapter 2.  A brief summary of the relevant points 
disĐussed iŶ Chapteƌ Ϯ should giǀe ĐoŶteǆt to “aŵ͛s sǁitĐh-based learning opportunities and aid 
analysis of vignettes. 
 
Behaviourism construes learning as conditioning.  Conditioning has two forms: classical (Pavlovian) 
and operant (Skinnerian).   Classical conditioning involves the pairing of an unconditioned stimulus 
with a neutral stimulus resulting in the neutral stimulus becoming a conditioned stimulus.  A 
conditioned stimulus is a stimulus that has acquired the same behaviour-eliciting powers as the 
unconditioned stimulus. By contrast, operant conditioning involves increasing the likelihood of a 
particular behaviour reoccurring through positive reinforcement.  The operation through which 
operant conditioning occurs is the presentation of a reinforcer (stimulus) contingent upon the 
organism behaving in a particular way.  Both classical conditioning theory and operant conditioning 
theory understand behaviour as reflexive (i.e. non-volitional) and both theories rely on a notion of 
linear dependence or constancy between stimulus and response (Baars 1986, Gregory 1986, Reber 
1995, Skinner 1986).   
 
The behaviourist principles of learning are extended in the PMLD literature.  The PMLD child is still 
understood as a reflexive organism, but the repeated occurrence of stimulus-response constancy is 
said to support the growth of contingency awareness (knowledge of cause-effect relations), 
understood as a pre-requisite for volitional action and communicative intent.  The use of the terms 
͞aǁaƌeŶess͟, ͞kŶoǁledge͟, aŶd ͞pƌefeƌeŶĐe͟ iŶ the PMLD liteƌatuƌe ŵaƌks a geŶuiŶe depaƌtuƌe 
from the original behaviourist conception of the organism as a mindless entity. 
 
Behaviourist-oriented switch-based training programs are typically operant in nature and aim to 
either establish new switch-press behaviour or evoke a rise in frequency of established behaviour 
through the presentation of preferred stimuli contingent upon switch-pressing.  These programs 
typically involve trying to encourage a PMLD participant to execute switch-press behaviour through 
soŵe foƌŵ of pƌoŵptiŶg, suĐh as ǀeƌďal pƌoŵpts ;e.g. ͞Pƌess the sǁitĐh.͟Ϳ oƌ phǇsiĐal pƌoŵpts ;e.g. 
where the prompter takes the hand of the PMLD participant and places it on the switch).  The 
switch-press behaviour results in the presentation of stimuli.  It is hoped that this process of 
prompting will support the development of contingency awareness (knowledge of cause-effect 
relations) insofar as the PMLD participant learns that the stimuli are contingent upon switch-press 
behaviour.  If this awareness has been established, and if the stimuli are desired, then independent 
switch-press behaviour will be high in frequency/duration without the need for prompts.  Stimuli 
which are correlated with high frequency/duration switch-press behaviour are defined as 
reinforcers, insofar as they are deemed to strengthen the likelihood of switch-press behaviour 
(Lancioni et al. 2002, Logan et al. 2001, Saunders et al. 2003).   
 
Research regarding the efficacy of switch-based training programs aimed at developing contingency 
awareness and/or switch-press behaviour in people with PMLD has reported mixed success rates 
(Ivancic and Bailey 1996, Lancioni et al. 2001, Logan et al. 2001, Reid et al. 1991, Saunders et al. 
2003).  Reasons given for mixed results include difficulties in identifying preferred stimuli to act as 
reinforcers (Green et al. 1988; 1991; 2000, Ivancic and Bailey 1996, Logan et al. 2001, Pace et al. 
1985, Reid et al. 1999, Wacker et al. 1985; 1988), and problems with mediating behaviour states 
(Guess et al. 1993, Helm and Simeonsson 1989, Wolff 1959).  Contemporary research has explored 
the relation between behaviour state, stimuli preference and micro-switch usage in order to 
discover optimal learning conditions (Lancioni et al. 2002, Murphy et al. 2004, Mellstrom et al. 
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2005).  Within this research, behaviour states are understood as variables which stand between 
operant behaviour and contingent stimuli and mediate the probability of switch-press behaviour.  
Where this is the case, the identification and manipulation of environmental events which influence 
state conditions are of value to those wishing to alter PMLD behaviour.  However, to date, 
behaviourist researchers have found no generalisable relationship between state behaviour, 
environment, and micro-switch usage.  Each project has found only idiosyncratic relationships 
between the variables which relate on an individual basis, rather than a trans-PMLD basis.  The only 
exception to this idiosyncrasy is the novel investigation by Foreman et al. (2004) who explored the 
relationship between behaviour states and social milieu.  All PMLD participants observed in 
mainstream classrooms were said to have spent more time in desirable behaviour states (awake, 
happy, active, alert etc) and participated more in some form of social interaction than their matched 
PMLD peers in segregated classrooms.  However, no consideration was given to the extent which 
social milieus effect switch-press activity.  
 
The ǀigŶette aŶalǇsis ďeloǁ ĐoŵpliŵeŶts aŶd eǆteŶds FoƌeŵaŶ et al.͛s ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ĐoŶĐlusioŶ ďǇ 
eǆploƌiŶg the ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiour state, his switch-press activities and his educational 
settiŶg.  The ƌeseaƌĐh fouŶd that “aŵ͛s ƌaŶge of ďehaǀiouƌs toǁaƌds sǁitĐhes ǁas ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt upoŶ 
the context in which his switch-based activities occurred.  The following two vignettes demonstrate 
the way Sam usually responded to switch-based learning in his segregated setting.  In the first, Sam 
is placed in front of a computer.  The computer software is activated with a press of the switch.  Sam 
passes from Self-Active-Happy when by himself on the carpet (gargling saliva, shaking his head, 
vocalising) to Passive-UŶhappǇ ;his ͞floppǇ͟ ďodǇ is a foƌŵ of ƌesistaŶĐeͿ, to “elf-Active-Unhappy 
(slapping himself, pinching the back of his neck, pulling his hair etc): 
 
Vignette 1: Sam with switch-activated computer program in his special school, adult support – 
Passive-Unhappy moving to Self-Active-Unhappy 
 
͞“aŵ is sat oŶ the Đaƌpet.  His head is tilted ďaĐk as if he is lookiŶg up at the ĐeiliŶg, ďut 
his eyes are rolled back.  He gargles and shakes his head left and right repeatedly whilst 
ǀoĐalisiŶg ;͞...aaaaah aaaaah uuuuuh aaaaah...͟Ϳ.  AŶ L“A2 walks over to him, puts her 
hands under his armpits, picks him up, and carries him a short distance to his wooden 
chair on wheels.  She places him in the chair, straps him (seatbelt around his waist, feet 
in the stirrups), and clips a tray to the chair.  Sam is then wheeled to the computer desk.  
The L“A ĐoŶŶeĐts a sǁitĐh to the Đoŵputeƌ, plaĐes the sǁitĐh oŶ “aŵ͛s tƌaǇ, aŶd loads 
the software.  All this time Sam is passive and slouched, almost like a floppy rag-doll.  
The LSA tests the software to make sure the switch is working. The switch press 
activates a sample of loud acid house music.  The beats are fast and repetitive; the 
synthesiser rifts are high-pitch and frantic; the vocals are shrill.  Animation accompanies 
the ŵusiĐ.  Lights flash ĐƌeatiŶg a stƌoďe effeĐt; silhouette figuƌes daŶĐe; aŶd ͞tƌippǇ͟ 
patterns unfold in the corners of the screen.  The LSA has left me to work with Sam.  He 
makes no attempt to press the switch and looks increasingly frustrated, moaning to 
himself and shakes in his chair (is he trying to get out?), looking everywhere but the 
screen.  I encourage him to press the switch, vocally at first, and then by holding his 
hand and placing it on the switch.  I repeat this several times.  The music plays and the 
graphics flash.  Sam becomes aggressive towards himself.  He snatches his hand away 
from me and slaps himself in the face, pulls his hair, pinches the side of his neck and 
flaps his arms.  He repeats in various combinations, over and over.  I pat Sam on his 
ďaĐk aŶd speak joǀiallǇ to hiŵ, tƌǇiŶg to Đalŵ hiŵ doǁŶ.  He ďeĐoŵes less ͞self-aĐtiǀe͟.  
I ask him to press the switch again and avoid touching him.  He is not looking at the 
                                                             
2
 ͞Learning support assistaŶt͟ (LSA); also kŶoǁŶ iŶ the UK as: ͞Đlassƌooŵ assistaŶt͟ ;CAͿ oƌ ͞teaĐhiŶg assistaŶt͟ 
(TA) 
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screen.  He shakes his head left and right, wiggles in his chair, and slaps his face 
occasionally.  Several minutes pass.  I press the switch hoping that he will look at the 
screen.  He only briefly glances at it.  He keeps raising his flapping arms and hitting the 
table with them.  He presses the switch with his forearms (but was it accidental?). He 
repeats the action, but does not hit the switch.  Sam is now hitting himself over and 
over again.  His skin is becoming red.  Despite holding apart his arms, I can feel him 
fighting me.  Eventually an LSA walks over, removes Sam from the chair and places him 
on his favourite vibrating rug.  He keeps hitting himself and it takes a lot of effort to 
sooth hiŵ͟. 
 
From a behaviourist perspective, there is nothing here to suggest that Sam is able to engage in 
switch-based activities.  There is one incident of switch-press behaviour - a single switch-press - but 
it is uŶĐleaƌ ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot this pƌess ǁas aĐĐideŶtal.  Is “aŵ ͞ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐǇ aǁaƌe͟?  AgaiŶ, theƌe is 
little in this vignette to say that he is.  What counts as evidence of contingency awareness for 
behaviourism is data demonstrating sustained and repeated pressing (e.g. Green et al. 1988; 1991, 
Kennedy and Harding 1993, Ivancic and Bailey 1996, Logan et al. 2001, Saunders et al. 2005, etc), 
something clearly lacking in the above vignette.  If switch-press behaviour is the only type of 
behaviour to be counted as evidence of contingency awareness then Sam is not contingency aware 
in this (and other) vignettes. 
 
In the behaviourist literature, explanation for the lack of switch-press behaviour includes suggestions 
of uneducability (Reid et al. 1991), lack of preferred stimuli to act as reinforcers (Green et al. 1988; 
1991; 2000, Ivancic and Bailey 1996, Logan et al. 2001, Pace et al. 1985, Reid et al. 1999, Wacker et 
al. 1985; 1988), and problems with mediating behaviour states (Arthur 2004, Foreman et al. 2004, 
Guess et al. 1993, Helm and Simeonsson 1989, Wolff 1959).  Out of these suggestions, the first is 
unwarranted.  Whilst the above vignette demonstrates no evidence of learning through the switch-
ďased aĐtiǀitǇ, “aŵ͛s self-directed behaviour may be considered as evidence of conditioning derived 
fƌoŵ ͞uŶfoƌtuŶate ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐies͟ ;‘eďeƌ ϭϵϵϱ, p. ϵϬͿ.  The seĐoŶd aŶd third suggestions have some 
merit.  It may be said that Sam is not faced with a preferred stimulus, and as such the computer 
program does not act as a reinforcer.  With regards to the issue of behaviour states, Sam was clearly 
not in a state conducive to learning.  His self-directed behaviours (his hitting) emerged in relation to 
the switch-based activity – being strapped into a chair and forced to interact with a computer (first, 
through verbal prompting, and second, through physical encouragement) resulted in a clear decline 
of behaviour state (he was self-active-happy on the carpet, passive unhappy in his chair to begin 
with, then self-active unhappy during intervention) 
 
Fƌoŵ a ďehaǀiouƌist peƌspeĐtiǀe, “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ ǁould ďe ĐoŶsideƌed steƌeotǇped ;laĐking in 
function) and maladaptive (self-injurious).  In Chapter 2, stereotyped and maladaptive behaviours 
were described as behaviours that fail to provide adequate or appropriate adjustment to the 
environment (Gregory 1987).  Such behaviours were described as repetitive, topographically 
unvaried, and lacking responsiveness to environmental change.  These behaviours were also said to 
disturb or alarm others and include such things as rocking, hand-flapping, head-weaving, and light-
gazing (Murdoch 1997).  The reduction of stereotyped behaviour was described as being motivated 
by three beliefs: (i) stereotypy interferes with learning, (ii) benign behaviours (such as head-banging) 
may become self injurious, and (iii) responses to individuals with the behaviours will be typically 
negative (Jones et al. 1995, in Murdoch 1997).   
 
Whilst this siŶgle ǀigŶette does Ŷot deŵoŶstƌate the topologiĐal iŶǀaƌiaŶĐe of “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌs ;the 
next two vignettes will serve this purpose), it does show behavioural repetition and a level of 
unresponsiveness to environmental change (insofar as the behaviours are largely consistent 
throughout the switch-press activity - though varied in intensity and combination - and continue 
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after the session (to the extent that it takes a while to sooth Sam afterwards)).  And, although this 
ǀigŶette does Ŷot deŵoŶstƌate it, “aŵ ǁould soŵetiŵes ďeĐoŵe ͞loĐked͟ iŶto his head-hitting, and 
would repeat the hitting over and over throughout a lesson or session.  Despite varying in intensity 
over the course of the session, the hitting was always present over a prolonged period of time.  In 
the aďoǀe ǀigŶette ďeiŶg disĐussed, “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ, as steƌeotǇped aŶd ŵaladaptiǀe, ŵaǇ ďe said 
to fit into three categories that motivate intervention to prevent the behaviours (according to Jones 
et al. 1995, in Murdoch 1997): Sam does not press the switch but directs his behaviour towards 
himself, which may be said to be an inversion of what is required for learning to occur.  His slapping, 
pinching, flapping, and hair-pulling are self-injurious to the extent that red marks appear on his face.  
FiŶallǇ, ŵǇ ƌespoŶse to his ďehaǀiouƌ ǁas ͞Ŷegatiǀe͟ iŶsofaƌ as I atteŵpted to pƌeǀeŶt his self-
directed actions, at first in a non-invasive way (jovial speech, back stroking) and later in an invasive 
way (holding his arms so he is unable to strike himself).   
 
AŶd Ǉet, despite this ĐoŶgƌueŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ aŶd the ďehaǀiouƌist eǆplaŶatioŶ, the 
ďehaǀiouƌ desĐƌiďed iŶ the ǀigŶette ĐoŶtƌadiĐts ďehaǀiouƌisŵ͛s ŵost ďasiĐ pƌeŵise, i.e. the notion of 
liŶeaƌ depeŶdeŶĐe oƌ ĐoŶstaŶĐǇ ďetǁeeŶ stiŵulus aŶd ƌespoŶse.  “aŵ͛s ͞ƌefleǆ ƌespoŶses͟ laĐk oŶe-
to-one correspondence with the presentation of the stimulus (be that the presence of the switch or 
the audio-visual activity of the computeƌͿ.  “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌal seƋueŶĐes aƌe ǀaƌied eǀeŶ though the 
stimulus remains the same.  Behaviourism is unable to give reason to the observation that the same 
stiŵuli ĐaŶ pƌoǀoke diffeƌeŶt ƌespoŶses.  Whilst “aŵ͛s sǁitĐh pƌesses ŵaǇ ďe Đoƌƌelated ǁith his 
self-directed behaviour (in the first instance, I put his hand on the switch, in the second instance, he 
(accidently) hits the switch himself), this behaviour is not uniformed but dynamic and varied (despite 
ďeiŶg Đlusteƌed uŶdeƌ the headiŶgs ͞steƌeotǇped͟ aŶd ͞ŵaladaptiǀe͟Ϳ. 
 
This notion of differential responses to the same stimulus is described in vignette 2 (below).  This 
vignette records the daily special school greeting activity in which each child is required to press the 
switch during a song.  The switch press results in a pre-ƌeĐoƌded ŵessage ďeiŶg eŵitted: ͞Good 
ŵoƌŶiŶg!͟  “aŵ ƌeaĐts adǀeƌselǇ to the aĐtiǀitǇ. 
 
Vignette 2: Sam with switch-activated greeting in his special school, adult-support – Passive-
Unhappy, moving to Self-Active-Unhappy 
 
͞“am has just been strapped to his stander (a wooden frame used to support standing 
and improve posture).  A tray is bolted to the stander and Sam is wheeled to the centre 
of the Đlassƌooŵ ǁheƌe the otheƌ ĐhildƌeŶ aƌe ͞staŶdiŶg͟.  The ĐhildƌeŶ foƌŵ a ĐiƌĐle 
with the teacher in the middle.  Sam is looking bored.  He licks his bottom lip, rolls his 
eyes back and shows the whites of his eyes.  He shakes his head left and right 
repeatedly.  He stops, curls up his top lip and exposes his teeth, frowns and vocalises 
uŶhappǇ souŶds ;͞....uuuuƌgh!͟Ϳ ǁhilst lookiŶg up at the ĐeiliŶg.  L“As plaĐe sǁitĐhes oŶ 
the tƌaǇs of eaĐh Đhild.  The teaĐheƌ siŶgs the ͞Good ŵoƌŶiŶg soŶg͟ aŶd Đalls the Ŷaŵe 
of the child who is meant to press the switch at the end of each verse. The switch emits 
the pre-ƌeĐoƌded phƌase: ͞Good ŵoƌŶiŶg, eǀeƌǇoŶe!͟  “aŵ ďeĐoŵes iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ 
impatient.  He flaps his arms like a bird.  He then starts to slap the side of his face, 
pinches his neck, and pulls his hair.  He pushes the switch off the table and it crashes to 
the floor.  Over time his self-stimulation becomes notably self-injurious, with red marks 
appearing on his face and neck where he is hitting and pinching himself.  An LSA 
restrains Sam by holding his arms apart whilst talking gently to him.  It looks like Sam is 
fighting the LSA - his movements are centripetal and it is as if Sam is repeatedly trying to 
hit hiŵself agaiŶst the ǁill of the L“A.  EǀeŶtuallǇ, it is “aŵ͛s tuƌŶ to saǇ ͞good ŵoƌŶiŶg͟ 
and press his switch.  The LSA gently moves both of “aŵ͛s haŶds oǀeƌ the sǁitĐh aŶd 
presses down.  The message is played and the teacher enthusiastically wishes Sam 
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͞good ŵoƌŶiŶg͟.  “he ŵakes eǇe ĐoŶtaĐt, sŵiles theŶ Ŷods aŶd pƌaises “aŵ.  The L“A 
lets go of “aŵ͛s haŶds aŶd eŶĐouƌages “aŵ to hit the sǁitch.  Sam pauses.  The adults 
wait in anticipation.  Several seconds go by.  Sam suddenly pushes the switch off the 
taďle aŶd slaps hiŵself iŶ the faĐe͟. 
 
CoŶsisteŶt ǁith the pƌeǀious ǀigŶette ;ǀigŶette ϭͿ, “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ duƌiŶg this ǀigŶette ;ǀigŶette ϮͿ 
is self-directed in a way that may be considered self-injurious.  The same type of activity (switch-
pƌessiŶgͿ is ƌespoŶded to ǁith the saŵe Đlusteƌ of ďehaǀiouƌs diƌeĐted toǁaƌds “aŵ͛s oǁŶ ďodǇ 
;pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ his headͿ.  OŶĐe agaiŶ, “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ ĐaŶ ďe described as maladaptive, a product 
of ͞uŶfoƌtuŶate ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐies͟, laĐkiŶg iŶ appƌopƌiate ďehaǀiouƌ state ĐoŶduĐiǀe to leaƌŶiŶg, a 
product of inappropriate reinforcers etc.  And once again, behaviourism is unable to give reason to 
the observation that the same stimulus (switch-press activity) provokes differential responses 
(different combinations of maladaptive behaviour: hitting, pinching, fighting the LSA, pushing the 
sǁitĐh off the taďle etĐͿ.  Noǁ, it ŵaǇ ďe aƌgued that “aŵ͛s stiŵulus iŶ ǀigŶette Ϯ ;the pre-recorded 
message) is different to the stimulus in vignette 1 (a computer program), but as will be shown 
shortly, a pre-recorded voice was the stimulus used in his mainstream school which resulted in the 
obverse of his special school reactions (Sam was active, happy, frequently pressing the switch etc – 
more on this shortly).  However, even if this were not so, and the challenge that the switch-press 
resulted in different stimuli remained (thus negating the value of contrasting how the same stimuli 
could provoke differential reactions), behaviourists would still have to account for the fact that 
different stimuli resulted in the same behaviour.  This is something that the behaviourists cannot do.  
The same argument against the behaviourist logic is present: the simple constancy between stimulus 
and response has broken.  Behaviourism is unable to make intelligible neither the fact that the same 
stimulus provoked different reactions, nor can it make intelligible the fact that different stimuli 
provoked the saŵe ƌeaĐtioŶ.  “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ ƌesists ďeiŶg ŶeatlǇ Đategoƌised iŶ suĐh a siŵple ǁaǇ.  
Inconsistency replaces constancy. 
 
Before attempting to interpret these vignettes from the two remaining perspectives (cognitive 
psychology and phenomenology), it is worth citing one more vignette which both compliments and 
contrasts the previous vignettes discussed so far.  In this vignette (vignette 3), Sam is presented with 
a switch which has the pre-ƌeĐoƌded ŵessage: ͞Good ŵoƌŶiŶg!͟ ;the ŵessage is the saŵe as that 
described in vignette 2).  In vignette 3, Sam once again behaves in a way that disturbs the 
behaviourist stimulus-ƌespoŶse ƌelatioŶship, ďut he does so iŶ a ͞positiǀe͟ ǁaǇ ;he is happǇ, eǆĐited, 
active and displaying awareness of switch-press behaviour). 
 
Vignette 3: Sam with switch-activated greeting in his mainstream school, peer-support – Other-
Active-Happy, moving to Other-Object-Awareness  
 
͞“aŵ is sat oŶ his aƌtifiĐial gƌass ŵat oŶ the Đaƌpet foƌ ƌegistƌatioŶ.  He is iŶ the ŵiddle 
of a group of approximately twenty children.  All the children are close to one another, 
chatting, and filling the room with hubbub.  Sam groans and extends his arms and legs 
in front of him.  He then leans back into a group of chatting girls.  He giggles and lets 
them support his weight.  The girls giggle and do not move.  Although they do not 
attempt to talk to Sam, they do not move away either and eventually carry on chatting. 
The teaĐheƌ Đalls “aŵ͛s Ŷaŵe ǁhilst takiŶg ƌegisteƌ.  NoƌŵallǇ at this poiŶt “aŵ ǁould 
be presented ǁith a sǁitĐh fƌoŵ his L“A.  This does Ŷot happeŶ.  OŶe of “aŵ͛s 
neighbours stands up, walks over to a yellow box in the corner near the teacher, pulls 
out his sǁitĐh aŶd ƌetuƌŶs to the Đaƌpet.  “he tells “aŵ to pƌess his ͞ďlue ďuttoŶ͟ aŶd 
smiles.  Sam leaŶs foƌǁaƌd.  The giƌl takes “aŵ͛s haŶd aŶd plaĐes it oŶ top of the sǁitĐh.  
The switch is activated and emits a pre-ƌeĐoƌded ͞Good ŵoƌŶiŶg!͟ ŵessage.  “aŵ 
repeatedly hits the switch with both hands (he raises his hands, then suddenly slaps the 
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switch held in front of him, lets his hands fall on his lap, and repeats several times).  
Sam presses the switch before the recorded message has ended, resulting in the first 
half of the message being played, over and over.  Between each switch-press Sam flaps 
his aƌŵs like a ďiƌd ǁhilst sŵiliŶg aŶd ǀoĐalises ;͞Ooooooh!!!͟Ϳ.  He ǁiggles his legs 
outstretched in front of him and hits the floor with the back of his heels.  He slaps his 
head with both hands and makes happy sounds.  An LSA walks over to Sam and the girl 
giǀes the L“A the sǁitĐh.  The L“A Đƌosses “aŵ͛s legs, ŵakes hiŵ sit up stƌaight, aŶd 
ǁalks aǁaǇ͟. 
 
In this vignette, Sam is clearly happy and active around his mainstream school peers.  He presents as 
being particularly excited during the switch-based exĐhaŶge ǁith a peeƌ iŶ ǁhiĐh he stƌikes his ͞ďlue 
ďuttoŶ͟ ƌepeatedlǇ, ŵakiŶg ͞happǇ Ŷoises͟ ;͞Ooooooh!!!͟Ϳ aŶd displaǇiŶg aǁaƌeŶess of hoǁ to 
behave towards switches (switches are for pressing).  This behaviour contrasts starkly with his 
behaviour during switch-based activities in his special school (vignettes 1 and 2).  In his special 
sĐhool, “aŵ͛s sǁitĐh-press behaviour was very limited, whilst being typically adult-supported and 
ƌesultiŶg iŶ ƌesistaŶĐe aŶd/oƌ aggƌessioŶ fƌoŵ “aŵ.  “aŵ͛s diffeƌeŶtial ƌesponses to the same 
stimulus (be that switch-presentation or a pre-ƌeĐoƌded ͞Good ŵoƌŶiŶg!͟ ŵessageͿ eǆteŶd the poiŶt 
made previously about the breakdown of simple linear dependence.  For the behaviourist literature, 
a stimulus acts as a reinforcer, or it does not.  There is no discussion about how the same subject can 
present as being contingency-aware and not-ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐǇ aǁaƌe depeŶdiŶg oŶ ĐoŶteǆt. “aŵ͛s 
switch-press behaviour shifts according to where he is and who is supporting him.   
 
This draws attention to the way switch-press behaviour is mediated by behaviour states (Guess et al. 
1993, Helm and Simeonsson 1989, Wolff 1959) and the way the behaviour states themselves are 
mediated by environmental variables.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the original behaviour state 
research found no relationship between behaviour state and environment (Guess et al. 1993).  
Recent research has explored the relationship between behaviour states and mainstream school 
environments (Arthur et al. 2004, Foreman et al. 2004).  The PMLD participants observed in the 
mainstream classrooms were said to have spent more time in desirable behaviour states and 
participated more in some form of social interaction than their matched PMLD peers in segregated 
classrooms.  The original behaviour state research (Guess et al. 1993, Helm and Simeonsson 1989, 
Wolff 1959) failed to consider whether differential educational environments (mainstream vs. 
special) or differential peer groups (with vs. without disability) could affect behaviour state. 
 
Saŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ states ĐoŵpleŵeŶt the fiŶdiŶgs of Aƌthuƌ et al. ;ϮϬϬϰͿ foƌ ;as ǁill ďe disĐussed 
lateƌͿ “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ state iŶ his ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ sĐhool ǁas pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ Otheƌ-Active-Happy. 
Contemporary behaviourist research that explores the relation between behaviour state, stimuli 
preference and switch usage in the hope of discovering optimal learning conditions (e.g. Lancioni et 
al. 2002, Murphy et al. 2004, Mellstrom et al. 2005) has so far overlooked the way in which 
mainstream classrooms affect behaviour state.  For Sam, there was a clear relation between 
educational context, behaviour state and switch-press behaviour.  As vignette 3 shows, in his 
mainstream school Sam pressed his switch freely and frequently when on the carpet with his peers.  
The social ŵilieu had a positiǀe effeĐtiǀe oŶ “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ state aŶd sǁitĐh-press behaviour.   
 
UŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ fƌoŵ a ďehaǀiouƌist peƌspeĐtiǀe has so faƌ Ǉielded ŵiǆed ƌesults.  
“aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ ŵakes pƌoďleŵatiĐ the ŶotioŶ of liŶeaƌ depeŶdeŶĐe ďetween stimulus and 
response.  His behaviour during switches-based activities is varied and complex and resists being 
described in terms of simple constancy between reinforcer strength and switch-press behaviour.  
However, consideration of behaviour states during analysis has allowed fruitful differentiation 
between levels of alertness in relation to activities and environments. 
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Behaǀiouƌisŵ͛s failuƌe to ŵake seŶse of “aŵ͛s sǁitĐh-press behaviour invites interpretation from a 
different theoretical perspective.  In PMLD studies, this alternative perspective is exclusively 
ĐogŶitiǀe psǇĐhologǇ.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ĐogŶitiǀe psǇĐhologǇ is eƋuallǇ poǁeƌless to ŵake iŶtelligiďle “aŵ͛s 
differential behaviours.  To recap, according to the cognitive perspective, behaviours indicative of 
communicative intent must resemble descriptions of proto-imperative or proto-declarative 
ďehaǀiouƌs ;Bates et al. ϭϵϳϱ, iŶ Coupe O͛KaŶe aŶd Goldďaƌt ϭϵϵϴͿ.  These pƌoto- behaviours, in 
which a subject co-ordinates the regard of self and other in relation to an object, are described as 
the earliest form of meaningful communication.  Without a capacity for such person-person-object 
engagement, the subject cannot be considered an intentional communicator (and lacks awareness 
of other as subject).  Proto-imperative behaviour involves an infant using a reach-for-real action as a 
reach-for-signal.  Reach-for-real consists of an infant reaching for something that is within reach in 
order to get hold of it.  Reach-for-signal involves the infant reaching for something that is out of 
reach.  By incorporating looking from the desired object to the adult and then back again into the 
reach-for-signal, the infant is said to communicate to the adult that s/he wants the object s/he is 
reaching for, and knows that the adult can obtain it for him/her.  The infant is satisfied by the 
exchange when s/he obtains the desired object.  Proto-declarative behaviour is a variation of proto-
imperative behaviour.  During proto-declarative behaviour the infant directs the attention of the 
adult toward something of interest in order to share the experience with the adult (as opposed to 
obtaining an object).  During proto-declarative behaviour, an infant may point towards an object and 
ǀoĐalise: ͞Dah!͟, ǁhilst shiftiŶg his/heƌ gaze between the object and the adult.  The infant is satisfied 
ďǇ the eǆĐhaŶge ǁheŶ s/he oďseƌǀes the adult͛s gaze shift fƌoŵ the iŶfaŶt, to the oďjeĐt, aŶd ďaĐk to 
the infant again.  Typically developing infants are said to engage in proto-imperative and proto-
deĐlaƌatiǀe ďehaǀiouƌs aƌouŶd ϭϬ ŵoŶths afteƌ ďiƌth.  Coupe O͛KaŶe aŶd Goldďaƌt ;ϭϵϵϴͿ suggest 
that people with PMLD are unlikely to develop these joint attention capacities, and as such will 
forever remain pre-communicative. 
 
Vignettes 1 and 2 describe Sam interacting (or resisting interacting) with a switch.  No proto-
imperative or proto-declarative behaviours are described.  Thus, from the above perspective, Sam is 
Ŷot iŶteŶtioŶallǇ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg.  His ďehaǀiouƌ ǁould ďe laďelled ͞pƌe-intentional comŵuŶiĐatioŶ͟ 
;Coupe O͛KaŶe aŶd Goldďaƌt ϭϵϵϴ; Goldďaƌt ϭϵϵϰ, NiŶd aŶd Heǁett ϭϵϵϰ; ϮϬϬϭ, Waƌe ϭϵϵϰ; ϮϬϬϯͿ.  
Pre-intentional communication is a term given to the act of interpreting the meaning of expressive 
behaviours, such as crying or laughing.  Such expressive behaviours occur without the expressive 
ageŶt iŶteŶdiŶg to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate ;s/he laĐks the aďilitǇ to do soͿ.  “aŵ͛s self-directed activity in both 
ǀigŶettes, his aĐt of pushiŶg sǁitĐhes aǁaǇ fƌoŵ his ďodǇ, aŶd his ͞fights͟ ǁith ďoth ŵǇself ;ǀigŶette 
1) aŶd his L“A ;ǀigŶette ϮͿ aƌe Ŷot ĐoŶsideƌed foƌŵs of iŶteŶtioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ.  “uĐh ͞Ŷegatiǀe͟, 
resistant or defiant behaviours are not considered to be sources of intended meaning.  His 
movements are clearly expressive, but are pre-symbolic and non-triadic. 
 
TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ŵodel of iŶfaŶtile iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀe deǀelopŵeŶt is also uŶaďle to 
ŵake seŶse of “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌs.  As disĐussed iŶ pƌeǀious Đhapteƌs, TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ 
cognitive model contrasts to the models used by the PMLD studies community insofar as Trevarthen 
and Aitken (2001) articulate a view of primary intersubjectivity.  Infants are said to be endowed with 
ĐapaĐities foƌ sustaiŶed soĐial eǆĐhaŶges, ŵotiǀated ďǇ aŶ iŶfaŶt͛s iŶŶate aďilitǇ to peƌĐeiǀe otheƌs 
as subjects rather than objects.  However, Trevarthen and Aitken (2001) only describe mutually 
satisfying social exchanges (person-person, or primary intersubjectivity) or social games involving 
the mutual coordination of objects (person-person-object, or secondary intersubjectivity, which is 
similar to the proto-imperative and proto-declarative exchanges described above).  Whilst 
TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ŶotioŶ of pƌiŵaƌǇ iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀitǇ ŵakes iŶtelligiďle those 
behaviours that are non-triadic, primary intersubjectivity is understood solely in terms of face-to-
faĐe iŶteƌaĐtioŶ.  The Ŷatuƌe of the “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ iŶ ǀigŶette ϭ aŶd ǀigŶette Ϯ is Ŷot faĐe-to-face 
activity.  There is no mutual satisfaction, there are no smiles, eye contact, turn-taking, giggles etc.  As 
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such, Trevarthen and Aitken (2001) have nothing to offer.  They only provide explanation of the 
happy (not the unhappy), and of the intimate (not the larger, more aggressive movements described 
iŶ the fiƌst tǁo ǀigŶettesͿ.  “o, oŶĐe agaiŶ, “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌs aƌe lost.  TheǇ do Ŷot ͞fit͟ the eǆistiŶg 
frameworks.  Behaviourist and the cognitive approaches cannot account for the behaviours 
described.  They cannot make Sam intelligible.   
 
Vignette 3 describes Sam repeatedly pressing the switch that his peer offered him.  During this 
episode, “aŵ ǁas ĐleaƌlǇ happǇ, eǆĐited, aŶd foĐused oŶ the sǁitĐh that ͞spoke͟ foƌ hiŵ ;ďǇ 
gƌeetiŶg the Đlass ͞Good ŵoƌŶiŶg!͟ ǁith eaĐh pƌessͿ.  The desĐƌiptioŶ of the episode Đaptuƌes “aŵ 
interacting with an object that a subject is holding, and doing so with zeal.  Despite the person-
person-oďjeĐt Ŷatuƌe of this eǆĐhaŶge, “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ still eǀades the teƌŵ ͞iŶteŶtioŶal 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͟ fƌoŵ the peƌspeĐtiǀe of PMLD studies.  “aŵ does Ŷot ŵake eǇe ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith his 
peer, point, or reach-for-sigŶal iŶ oƌdeƌ to oďtaiŶ aŶ oďjeĐt.  TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ŶotioŶ 
of secondary intersubjectivity may be said to offer room for theorising the interactive event.  
However, this room exists only because Trevarthen and Aitken (2001) fail to offer anything in the 
way of a description of what secondary intersubjectivity looks like.  If secondary intersubjectivity is 
to positively afford a greater range of meaningful behaviours than PMLD studies allows for, then 
there has to be an articulation of something extra.  This can be found through a synthesis of 
TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ŶotioŶ of seĐoŶdaƌǇ iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀitǇ ǁith aspeĐts of Meƌleau-
PoŶtǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal peƌspeĐtiǀe of ďeiŶg-in-the-world. 
 
Whilst the behaviourist and cognitive perspectives in PMLD studies makes limited sense of the 
behaviours described in the above vignettes, Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal peƌspeĐtiǀe 
allows us to foreground and theorise these behaviours in a much greater way, and does so in a way 
that ĐaŶ ĐoŵpleŵeŶt TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ fƌaŵeǁoƌk.   
 
Chapter 4 discussed Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ pheŶoŵeŶologǇ.  This disĐussioŶ aƌtiĐulated Meƌleau-
PoŶtǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ desĐƌiptioŶ of the ďodǇ as that ǁhiĐh is Ŷeitheƌ aŶ oďjeĐt iŶitself ;the body-object), 
nor something to be abstractly represented by a reflective consciousness, a foritself (the body 
image).  This third position between subject and object is a pre-objective understanding of the body.  
This bodily dimension is a mode of existence or being-in-the-world in which organisms have a form 
of bodily intentionality that plays beneath any overt sense of self, any thematic ego.  When Merleau-
PoŶtǇ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ĐhaƌaĐteƌises the ďodǇ iŶ teƌŵs of ͞eǆisteŶĐe͟, he ŵeaŶs that the ďodǇ is defiŶed ďǇ its 
͞pƌojeĐts͟ ;p. ϭϮϵͿ: ŵǇ ďodǇ ͞appeaƌs to ŵe as aŶ attitude diƌeĐted toǁaƌds ĐeƌtaiŶ eǆistiŶg oƌ 
possiďle tasks͟ ;p. ϭϭϰͿ.  HeŶĐe, the spatialitǇ of the ďodǇ is Ŷot oŶe of ͞loĐatioŶ͟ ďut of ͞situatioŶ͟.  
The ͞heƌe͟ of the ǁhole ďodǇ is its ͞situatioŶ iŶ faĐe of its tasks͟ ;p. ϭϭϱͿ iŶ ǁhiĐh oďjeĐts offeƌ 
theŵselǀes as ͞poles of aĐtioŶ͟ ;p. ϭϮϮͿ.  The ďodǇ ͞suƌges͟ toǁaƌds oďjeĐts to ďe gƌasped ;p. ϭϮϭͿ.  
These oďjeĐts aƌe uŶdeƌstood as ͞ŵaŶipulaŶda͟ – objects known in terms of how they can be acted 
upon, or ǁith ;p. ϭϮϬͿ.  The ǁoƌld is ͞a ĐolleĐtioŶ of possiďle poiŶts upoŶ ǁhiĐh ΀...΁ ďodilǇ 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ŵaǇ opeƌate͟ ;p.  ϭϮϭͿ. MotilitǇ, ͞iŶ its puƌe state, possesses the ďasiĐ poǁeƌ of giǀiŶg a 
ŵeaŶiŶg ;“iŶŶgeďuŶgͿ͟ ;p. ϭϲϰͿ.  This is esseŶtiallǇ ǁhat Meƌleau-PoŶtǇ ƌefeƌs to as ͞ŵotoƌ 
iŶteŶtioŶalitǇ͟ ;p. ϭϮϳͿ: ͞CoŶsĐiousŶess is iŶ the fiƌst plaĐe Ŷot a ŵatteƌ of ͚I thiŶk that͛ ďut of ͚I ĐaŶ͛͟ 
(p. 159). 
 
From Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal peƌspeĐtiǀe, “aŵ͛s diffeƌeŶtial sǁitĐh-press 
behaviour is a result of the way in which the different educational situations are practically signified.  
Different situations express different possibilities for interaction.  For Sam, the stimuli contingent 
upon switch-press behaviour is not universally important (if it was, he would have behaved 
enthusiastically towards switch-based activities in each of his settings where the stimuli were 
consistent, which was not the case).  What appears to be important for Sam was firstly his freedom.  
In his special school Sam was typically strapped into chairs and standers (something captured in 
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vignette 1 and 2), in his mainstream school he was typically without such constraint (captured in 
vignette 3).  Sam was typically aggressive towards himself during times of constraint, and as such 
was typically aggressive when in his special school (although self-directed aggression was observed 
in his mainstream school, but with much less intensity and frequency).  Secondly, the social milieu 
was important for Sam.  As will be discussed later, Sam was most active around his mainstream 
sĐhool peeƌs.  “iŶĐe the soĐial ŵilieu ǁas aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt faĐtoƌ ŵediatiŶg “aŵ͛s sǁitĐh-press 
behaviour, the question emerges as to what specifically Sam finds significant in these contexts – how 
does the social situatioŶ ƌelate to ŵotoƌ sigŶifiĐaŶĐe?  To ƌeiteƌate a pƌeǀious poiŶt, “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ 
toǁaƌds sǁitĐhes is uŶiŶtelligiďle fƌoŵ the ĐogŶitiǀe peƌspeĐtiǀe.  TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ 
secondary intersubjectivity (in which two people mutually engage with objects) is somewhat 
ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith Coupe O͛KaŶe aŶd Goldďaƌt͛s ;ϭϵϵϴͿ desĐƌiptioŶ of iŶteŶtioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
(borrowed from Bates et al. 1975).  Whilst Trevarthen and Aiken (2001) fail to offer any behavioural 
descriptors of secondary intersubjectivity, Coupe O͛KaŶe aŶd Goldďaƌt ;ϭϵϵϴͿ offeƌ ďehaǀiouƌal 
descriptors indicative of proto-declarative or proto-imperative competence. The vignettes above do 
not conform to the proto-imperative/-declarative descriptors and as such Sam could not be 
considered to be an intentional communicator.  And yet, Sam does engage with the switch when in 
the presence of peers in his mainstream school.  How can we make sense of this?  One explanation 
would be that the behaviours prescribed by PMLD studies as indicative of intentional communication 
are too narrow.  This is not to negate the value of proto-imperative/-declarative behavioural 
descriptors, but to call for a broader catalogue of behaviours suggestive of intersubjective awareness 
and communication.  Another explanatioŶ ŵaǇ ďe that “aŵ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ ƌeǀeals aŶ eŵeƌgeŶt leǀel of 
aǁaƌeŶess that is ŵoƌe sophistiĐated thaŶ TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ pƌiŵaƌǇ iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀitǇ 
(person-person interaction) but not as sophisticated as genuine secondary intersubjectivity (person-
person-object interaction as proto-imperative/-deĐlaƌatiǀeͿ.  This Ŷeǁ foƌŵ of ͞pƌoto-secondary-
iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀitǇ͟ ǁould eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ, iŶ the pƌeseŶĐe of his peeƌs, “aŵ ǁilfullǇ eŶgages ǁith oďjeĐts.  
There is something significant for Sam in this interactive situation, but this significance is not at the 
level of abstract, symbolic communication (proto-declarative/-imperative).  For Merleau-Ponty 
(2001), being-in-the-world consists of perception and action being linked in the sense that what is 
perceived is immediately understood as that which can be acted upon.  Experience requires or calls 
foƌ ŵoǀeŵeŶt.  If this ǀieǁ is sǇŶthesised ǁith that of TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg 
of the emergence of object cognition, then we become one-step closeƌ to theoƌisiŶg “aŵ͛s ͞pƌoto-
secondary-iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀitǇ͟.  As disĐussed pƌeǀiouslǇ, TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ aƌgue that 
infants possess an innate capacity for intersubjective awareness.  Further, in contradistinction to the 
claims of PMLD studies geneƌallǇ ;Coupe O͛KaŶe aŶd Goldďaƌt ϭϵϵϴ, NiŶd aŶd Heǁett ϭϵϵϰ; ϮϬϬϭ, 
Ware 1994; 2003 etc) which grounds itself in theories of other cognitive psychologists (e.g. Bates et 
al. 1975, Piaget 1962; 1968, Schaffer 1971a; 1971b, 1984 etc), Trevarthen and Aitken (2001) argue 
that object cognition emerges through early social exchanges, rather than vice-versa.  To quote 
Trevarthen and Aitken (2001): 
 
͞΀...΁ the pƌeǀailiŶg logiĐ Ŷeeds to ďe ƌeǀeƌsed; that oďjeĐt ĐogŶitioŶ aŶd ƌatioŶal 
intelligence in infants, and their perceptual preferences, should be viewed as the 
outcomes of a process that seeks guidance by person-perception and through 
communication with equivalent processes, of cognition-with-intention-and-emotion, in 
otheƌ peƌsoŶs͟ ;p. ϰͿ. 
 
From the perspective of PMLD studies, children with PMLD are pre-communicative because they are 
unable to comprehend the objective world (for example, they lack contingency awareness, etc).  
Fƌoŵ TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ peƌspeĐtiǀe, iŶfaŶts leaƌŶ aďout the oďjeĐtiǀe ǁoƌld through 
social engagement, defined in terms of primary intersubjectivity.  If Trevarthen and Aitken (2001) are 
ƌight, theŶ it ŵakes seŶse to saǇ that “aŵ͛s sǁitĐh-press behaviour in the presence of peers (and not 
adults or computer screens) emerged because it was through his peers that the switch was 
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understood as that which can be acted upon.  It was through sharing experiences with his peers that 
Đalled foƌ “aŵ͛s aĐtioŶs toǁaƌd the sǁitĐh.  Foƌ “aŵ, the soĐial ŵilieu ;TƌeǀaƌtheŶ aŶd AitkeŶ ϮϬϬϭͿ 
in his mainstream school presented as a behavioural setting (Merleau-Ponty 2002), which signified 
oďjeĐts as that thƌough ǁhiĐh soĐial eŶgageŵeŶt took plaĐe.  The adults aŶd peeƌs iŶ “aŵ͛s speĐial 
school context did not present in this way.  As will be discussed during analysis of the next group of 
vignettes, Sam was typically passive around others in his special school.  The school was void of 
motor significance on the scale that was seen in his mainstream school.  
 
Previous discussion considered the role of behaviour states (Guess et al. 1993, Foreman et al. 2004, 
Aƌthuƌ ϮϬϬϰͿ as ŵediatiŶg “aŵ͛s eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith his eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶts.  Fƌoŵ the ďehaǀiouƌist 
peƌspeĐtiǀe, these states aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed to iŶteƌǀeŶe ďǇ distuƌďiŶg the ͞ƌeadiŶess͟ of “aŵ to 
respond to his environmental stimuli.  From Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ peƌspeĐtiǀe of ďeiŶg-in-the-
world, these states take on new meaning.  The behaviour states emerge when Sam finds himself in a 
situation of significance.  Whilst being in a segregated classroom governed by behaviourist principles 
of learning may be non-stimulating for Sam (vignettes 1 and 2), being around others (especially 
peers) is meaningful and raises bodily expectations, alertness etc, and primes Sam to engage with his 
social milieu.  The behaviour states work beneath abstract forms of representational consciousness 
whilst motivating switch-press behaviour.  Australian behaviour state research (Foreman et al. 2004, 
Arthur 2004) indicates that PMLD children are in optimal learning states when in mainstream social 
milieus.  Observations of Sam in this study compliment the Australian research. 
